Statistical Decision Theory and the Selection of Grand Jurors: Testing for Discrimination in a Single Panel by Sperlich, Peter W. & Jaspovice, Martin L.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 2
Number 1 Winter 1975 Article 4
1-1-1975
Statistical Decision Theory and the Selection of
Grand Jurors: Testing for Discrimination in a Single
Panel
Peter W. Sperlich
Martin L. Jaspovice
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter W. Sperlich and Martin L. Jaspovice, Statistical Decision Theory and the Selection of Grand Jurors: Testing for Discrimination in a
Single Panel, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 75 (1975).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol2/iss1/4
Statistical Decision Theory and the Selection
Of Grand Jurors: Testing for Discrimination
In a Single Panel*
by
PETER W. SPERLICH* * AND MARTIN L. JASPOVICE***
Introduction
The contemporary American grand jury has suffered a significant
decline in public esteem. Among the more serious charges levelled are
that grand juries lack independence from the state and consequently
act as mere "rubber stamps" for the district attorney; that grand jurors
have permitted themselves to be utilized for purposes of harassing un-
popular political groups; and that grand juries have become the pre-
serve of the middle-class establishment.' As observed by Judge Mel-
vin P. Antell of the Essex County District Court in New Jersey:
Actually, the concern of protecting the individual from wrong-
ful prosecution is one about which grand juries in general show lit-
fie interest. It is edifying indeed to a new prosecutor to learn how
willing people are to let trouble descend upon their fellows. In
positions of authority, many are prepossessed by fancied obligations
to "back up" the police, to "stop mollycoddling", to "set examples".
Attitudes of understanding, of patient inquiry, of skeptical delibera-
tion, so needed in the service of justice, recede in the presence of
duly constituted officials and are replaced by a passive acceptance
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of Steven L. Coombs
of the University of Michigan, the efficient computer program written by Roger Johnson
of the University of California, and the many types of assistance received from the In-
stitute of Governmental Studies, the Graduate School of Public Policy, and the Depart-
ment of Political Science of the University of California, Berkeley.
** Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley.
*** J.D., 1972, University of California, Member, California Bar.
1. See AntelI, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.BAJ.
153-56 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Antell]; Goodell, Where Did The Grand fury Go?
247 HAPimR's MAGAZINE 14 (May, 1973); Kaufman, The Grand fury: Sword and
Shield, 20 Amrr c MoNTnMY 54-60 (April, 1962); Wickersham, The Grand Jury:
Weapon Against Crime and Corruption, 51 A.B.A.J. 1157 (1965). See also The Pro
and Con Discussion, The Question of Curtailing the Size of Juries, 50 CONG. DIras'r
210 (1971).
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of almost anything which seems to bear the sovereign's seal of ap-
proval.2
Grand juries have also been assailed as being unrepresentative of
the communities from which they are drawn. This shortcoming, which
has been emphasized repeatedly by members of various minority
groups, is most certainly related to the grand jury's lack of independ-
ence. In many states grand juries consist almost exclusively of mem-
bers of "advantaged" social groups with fairly conservative social and
political philosophies. It would be idle to pretend that the personal
and social characteristics of the jurors have no effect on the proceedings
and action of the jury. A jury that does not include the full range of
social experiences existing in the community which it represents will
not be able to respond properly to the broad scope of issues and prob-
lems that come before it.3
Challenges to the selection processes used to empanel grand juries
have vastly increased in the past few years.' At least for the states,
the case law governing selection remains vague and occasionally contra-
dictory. It is essential that both judicial and legislative leaders make
a concerted effort to clarify the existing law, with a view toward grant-
ing access to the political process to all groups.
Implementation of statistical decision theory methods in the area
of jury selection would lend predictability and clarity to a segment of
the law which has lacked both qualities since it first emerged. The
purpose of this article is to provide a statistical formula which will ac-
curately determine whether or not the use of discriminatory methods
has occurred in the selection of a particular jury panel.
The Constitutional Requirements"
The 1968 Jury Selection and Service Act,6 governing the selection
2. Antell, supra note 1, at 154-55.
3. As stated by the Court in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1972): "When
any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the
effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not neces-
sary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to con-
clude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented."
4. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N., THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMNISTRVAION OF
JusTIcE, 62-64 (5th ed. 1971).
5. For a comprehensive treatment of the constitutional requirements, see Sperlich
& Jaspovice, Grand Juries, Grand Jurors, and the Constitution, 1 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 63
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Sperlich & Jaspovicel.
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1871 (1968).
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of federal grand and petit juries, provides that "all citizens shall have
the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries"'7
and that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from service . . . on account
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."8  The
Act requires the random selection of jurors from voter registration lists9
and from supplemental sources when necessary,10 in an effort to pro-
duce jury panels which constitute "a fair cross section of the persons
residing in the community. . . wherein the court convenes.""
While state selection procedures lack uniformity, two predominant
types of state selection statutes can be identified. Some states utilize
random selection methods resembling the federal selection procedures
in constituting grand juries. Other states employ what has come to be
known as the "key man" selection system, which allows jury commis-
sioners or judges to select prospective grand jurors from among their
friends or acquaintances, the so-called key men, or from persons sug-
gested by their friends or acquaintances. In this manner a grand jury
panel or venire is established, and a drawing by lot from the list of com-
piled names is then used to determine the makeup of the actual grand
jury.
Regardless of the method of selection employed, all states are
bound to comply with the basic constitutional requirements governing
the selection of grand jurors. Shortly following the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held in Strauder v. West
Virginia'2 that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
amendment proscribe the statutory exclusion of persons from jury
service solely because of their race or color. Thereafter, in Neal v.
Delaware,'3 the High Court ruled that the equality of protection se-
cured by the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 4414 prohibits the
discriminatory application of racially neutral jury selection statutes.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1968).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (1968).
10. Id.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(3) (1968).
12. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
13. 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 44 is now embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1970), which provides:
"No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law
shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States,
or of any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and who.
ever, being an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summon-
ing of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such case, shall be fined not
more than $5,000."
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Since the Strauder and Neal opinions, the Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated the constitutional requirement that all jury panels, both petit
and grand, must be drawn from a cross-section of the eligible commu-
nity. 5 At the same time, the Court has consistently rejected the notion
that proportional representation of community groups is required by the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.16
The principle of cross-sectional representation requires that all el-
igible persons residing in the community be afforded an equal oppor-
tunity of being selected for jury service. As stated in Smith v. Texas:
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as
instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly represen-
tative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the
exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups. . . vio-
lates our Constitution and . . . is at war with our basic concepts
of a democratic society and a representative government.' 7
The concept of cross-sectional representation creates severe manage-
ment problems. In recognition of that fact, the Supreme Court in Her-
nandez v. Texas'8 held that only "distinct" community groups need be
considered by jury selectors in choosing a representative jury panel.' 9
Absent extraordinary efforts on the part of the selectors involved,
utilization of the key man selection system is highly unlikely to produce
the necessary cross-section in anything other than an unusually homo-
geneous community. In light. of that fact the Supreme Court has de-
veloped two constitutionally grounded affirmative duties to be adhered
to by key man selectors. The first requires that key man selectors fa-
15. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128, 130 (1940).
16. Cassel v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
402 (1945).
17. 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
18. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
19. Id. at 348-49. The loose formulation of the term "distinct group" by the Court
in Hernandez, coupled with the just recognition of the uniqueness of communities there,
tends naturally to enlarge the scope of the jury pool. Black persons aside, myriad groups
have been recognized as "distinct" since the Hernandez opinion, based upon national ori-
gin, name types, work status, religion, age, education, sex, and even political affiliations.
At least one court has recognized as a distinct group a hybrid of two of the above clas-
sifications. See Sperlich & Jaspovice, supra note 5, at 73-74.
The additional input required by Hernandez and its progeny is likely to have a no-
ticeable effect upon the product of the grand jury system. This conclusion may fairly
be inferred from the comprehensive study conducted at the University of Chicago Law
School by Professors Kalven and Zeisel in THE AMERICAN JuRY (1966). The data from
the Chicago study indicates that Black jurors vote differently from Caucasian jurors, that
working men vote differently from businessmen, and that persons of different national
ancestry have statistically significant divergent voting patterns.
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miliarize themselves with all of the community's population elements
in which qualified jurors may be found.20 -The second constitutional
duty requires that key man selectors: refrain from following a course
of conduct which naturally tends to exclude any group of potential
21jurors from jury service.
In the setting of a criminal case, challenges to grand jury selection
procedures must generally be raised before commencement of trial, by
pretrial motion to quash the indictment returned by the grand jury.22
Recently, the Supreme Court condoned the use of a civil class action
suit to attack allegedly discriminatory jury selection methods. 23 In
either case, the issue of standing to raise the particular challenge is no
longer a serious barrier. In federal court it has long been recognized
that any party to a criminal action has standing to attack the validity
of the selection system employed by the district court, whether or not
that party is a member of the class of persons allegedly excluded from
jury service.24  The Supreme Court in Peters v. Kift25 made applicable
to the states the same liberal standing interpretation adopted by the
federal courts, at least with regard to exclusions based upon race.26
20. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1940); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,
287-90 (1950). For a comprehensive discussion of the familiarization requirement, see
Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).
21. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561 (1943); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,
403-404 (1945).
22. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a)-(c) (1970).
23. Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). The Court stated: "De-
fendants in criminal proceedings do not have the only cognizable legal interest in non-
discriminatory jury selection. People excluded from juries because of their race are as
much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial
exclusion. Surely there is no jurisdictional or procedural bar to an attack upon system-
atic jury discrimination by way of a civil suit-suchas the one brought here. Id. at 329-
30.
24. See Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 37 n.1 (5th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 473-74 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
25. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
26. At least one court has held that the decision in Peters v. Kiff is appli-
cable only to challenges asserting racial discrimination. In People v. Superior Court, 38
Cal. App. 3d 966, 975, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732, 739- (1974), the Peters opinion was given
the following interpretation: "Where racial balance is not in issue, the rule of standing
remains unaffected; the accused may not assign discriminatory impanelment practices as
a ground of attack on the criminal prosecution unless he is a member of the excluded
class or otherwise shows a likelihood of bias."
The author of the opinion in People v. Superior Court, supra, failed to supply any
logical reason for the artificially drawn distinction between racial exclusion and exclu-
sions premised upon characterisitcs other than race. Three arguments are presented in
an effort to support the result: first, that the Peters decision dealt only with racial 6x-
clusion; second, that racial balance is an especially assured guarantee and thus entitled
to more widespread protection; and, third, that challenges to grand jury selection are
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A challenge to the selection procedure employed in choosing
grand or petit jurors can ,be presented in either or both of two basic
forms: (1) the challenge can assail the constitutional validity of the
statute or plan which prescribes the manner of selection, asserting that
it is incapable of yielding the results demanded by law; or (2) the chal-
lenge may concede the constitutionality of the governing statute, but
attack the way in which the statute is applied. Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia2 embodies the classic example of the first form of challenge.
Because there are no longer any state statutes such as that struck down
in Strauder, the second form of challenge prevails today.2
The discriminatory application of racially neutral statutes can be
attacked in three ways. The first entails a demonstration of discrimina-
tory outcome of the selection procedure. Pursuant to this method the
challenger has the burden of establishing a prima facie case by produc-
ing evidence which proves that there is a substantial disparity over time
between the percentage of the cognizable community group on the jury
roll or venire and that group's percentage in the relevant population.2"
Once a prima facie case has been proven, the burden shifts to the state
to justify the discrepancy. 30 The second method involves a showing
time consuming and since they may be pursued through the civil processes, only a lim-
ited number of such challenges should be allowed a criminal court forum.
None of these factors change the fundamental principle that an accused is denied
his right to due process and equal protection of the law if he is tried or indicted by
a jury which has not been drawn from a fair cross-section of the eligible community.
The notion of a fair cross-section necessarily contemplates all community characteristics,
and not just those of race.
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
28. Id. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
29. As stated in People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 390, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394
(1970): "While each jury roll or venire need not be a perfect mirror of the community
... any substantial disparity, over a period of time, between a group's percentage
thereon and its percentage in the eligible population is prima facie evidence of discrimi-
nation, regardless of the source of jurors, and shifts the burden to the prosecution to
justify the discrepancy."
30. In the majority of cases presenting this form of attack which have reached the
Supreme Court, the decision as to whether or not a prima facie case has been established
has turned on whether the outcome in question can be explained away by chance or
accident. Thus, in Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958), the Court declared,
"the uniform and long-continued exclusion of Negroes from grand juries shown by this
record cannot be attributed to chance [or] to accident .... ." More recently the Court
discussed "chance" in terms of statistical probability, suggesting that the existence or
nonexistence of a valid prima facie case may be determined in other than an arbitrary
manner: "While unnecessary to our disposition of the instant case, it is interesting to
note the 'probability' involved in the situation before the Court. The record does not
indicate how many Negroes were actually on the 'revised' jury list of approximately 600
names. One jury commissioner, however, said his best estimate was 25% to 307, which
[Vol. 2
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that discriminatory selection procedures have been indulged in by the
selectors. Thus, evidence proving that the selectors have failed to take
affirmative steps to comply with the two-fold constitutional duty im-
posed upon them and described above will allow the challenger to suc-
ceed. The actual outcome of the selection process is wholly inconse-
quential to the success or failure of this method. 1 The third and final
method requires a demonstration of a combination of factors indicative
of discrimination and may involve proof called for by the first and
second methods, in addition to other evidence."2
While it is incumbent upon the challenging party to prove "sys-
tematic" or "purposeful" discrimination3 3 in pursuit of each of the fore-
going formulae, he need not expose the specific intent of the selectors.
The intent to discriminate will be inferred by the court from proper
presentation of the method chosen. As stated in Rabinowitz v. United
States, "[i]f a fair cross-section is consistently lacking, then, without
more, it is established that the [jury] commissioners have failed in their
duty ."a
The predominant method of challenge to date has been that in-
volving the statistical prima facie case. Given the fact that innumerable
court hours have been consumed by attorneys pursuing this method,
it is regrettable that the court has yet to delineate clear standards
is close proximity to the 27.1% who were admittedly on the tax digest for 1964. As-
suming that 27% of the list was made up of the names of qualified Negroes, the math-
ematical probability of having seven Negroes on a venire of 90 is .000006. See Finkel-
stein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases,
80 HARv. L. Rnv. 338 (1966)." Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1967). See
also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630 n.9 (1972), in which the Court took
note of the petitioner's demonstration of statistical probability.
31. As stated by the Court in Cassell v. Texas: "Discrimination may be proved
in other ways than by evidence of long-continued unexplained absence of Negroes from
many panels. The statements of the jury commissioners that they chose only whom they
knew, and that they knew no eligible Negroes in an area where Negroes made up so
large a proportion of the population, prove the intentional exclusion that is discrimina-
tion in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights." 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950).
32. For an example of the application of this method see Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1972).
33. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 476-78 (1954); see People v. Nero, 19 Cal. App. 3d 904, 910, 97 Cal. Rptr. 145,
148 (1971).
34. 366 F.2d 34, 58 (5th Cir. 1966). As stated in Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770,
773 (5th Cir. 1966): "Thus we need not delve into the subjective intent of the jury
commissioners. . . nor need we credit their general assertions that they did not partici-
pate in any system or plan by which Negroes were systematically excluded from jury-
service ...since it is clear that they did not fulfill their duty of familiarizing them-
selves with the qualifications of Negroes eligible for jury service."
Winter 1975]
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against which statistical evidence could be measured to determine
whether or not a prima facie case has been established. This de-
ciency, however, can be remedied. As noted by one commentator:
The court's continued reliance on intuitive and untutored un-
derstanding of the laws of chance -is both unfortunate and -unneces-
sary. Statistical theory supplies mathematical means for determin-
ing the likelihood that chance is responsible for a given discrepancy
between the ratio of Negroes in the eligible population and their
ratio on jury lists, venires or panels. Logic and objectivity would
seem to compel the application of such an analysis in determining
when the size of the discrepancy eliminates chance as its likely
source and thus requires the state to come forward with evidence
explaining the discrepancy on non-discriminatory grounds. 85
The Computation of Probabilities for
Single Grand Jury Panels
It is but seldom that a community group (test group) will be rep-
resented on a grand jury panel in exact proportion to its size in the
eligible population. Nor, as seen, does the Court require exact pro-
portionality. The task is to discover whether or not the magnitude of
the divergence is within the range of chance fluctuation which is likely
to occur even when the selection methods are truly unbiased, i.e., ran-
dom.
Probability theory provides the principles and rules for the deter-
mination of the statistical significance of any particular selection out-
come. When the outcome is found to have statistical significance,30 it
is not consistent with the assumption that an unbiased selection took
place. Outcomes that do not have statistical significance, on the other
hand, are consistent with such an assumption, and therefore can be said
to have resulted from a selection process that provided everyone an
equal chance of being chosen,
The literature on the application of statistical methods in jury se-
35. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CA. L. Rv. 235, 255
(1968).
36. Statistical significance refers to a particular pre-selected level of probability.
The levels most often employed are .10, .05, and .01. A significance level of .01 means
that there is one chance in one hundred of an error, that is, that there is one chance
in one hundred that an unbiased selection will be judged biased. Significance can be
set at any level, e.g., .001, which would mean that there is only one chance in a thou-
sand of such an error. As it happens, however, as this type error is decreased another
type error is increased, namely, the error of letting a biased selection pass as unbiased.
The level of .05 represents an acceptable "compromise" in the effort to reduce all types
of error.
[Vol. 2
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lection cases is not large and is of fairly recent origin. An article by
Finkelstein is the best known single component of this literature.3 7 In
fact, Finkelstein's article has gained the status of a "classic." It has
been cited by the Supreme Court,38 and many discussions and evalua-
tions of the grand jury system make reference to it. 9
The present discussion of testing for discrimination in a single
panel is similar to that of Finkelstein. It differs from Finkelstein's dis-
cussion, however, in that it emphasizes more strongly that ranges of out-
comes must be considered rather than single outcomes, in that it pro-
vides concrete examples to demonstrate the importance of "range"
computations, and in that it offers a number of possible computational
shortcuts to reduce the large number of calculations associated with
"range" testing.
Probability theory indicates that the probability of a particular se-
lection outcome is determined by two factors, the unique likelihood of
the outcome, and the number of the ways in which this outcome can
be obtained. For example, if a population has three members, two
White and one Black, and if one person is to be selected, and if the
selection process is truly unbiased (random), then each of the three
persons has the identical chance (one out of three) of being selected.
Now, to compute the probability that a White person will be selected,
the unique likelihood of the selection of any White ('Y) must be mul-
tiplied by the number of ways in which a White person can be selected.
There are two such ways, namely, selecting White One and selecting
White Two. Therefore, the probability of selecting a White person in
a single draw is equal to 1/3 x 2, or %.
The computing principle can be extended to any number of per-
sons to be chosen at a particular time. The following formula is used
to compute the probability of selecting a certain number of persons
from a particular population for a grand jury panel of a certain size,
given the proportion of the test group in the eligible population:40
Pr- (N) (pr qnr) (1)r
The first component of the formula consists of a series of factorials.
37. Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Dis-
crimination Cases, 80 I-.v. L. REV. 338 (1966).
38. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1967).
39. E.g., UNrrED STATES COMMISSION ON Citm RIGHTS, MEmXcAN AMERICAN AND
TnE ADmmiNTsATION OF JuSTcE IN THE SouTHwT at 131-45 (1970).
40. See, e.g., BLALocK, SocL.. STATmICS 152-55 (2d ed. 1972).
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Thus:
Pr N! 1 ) (2)
r ( ) (n-r!)
Pr stands for the probability of the selection outcome, N for the size
of the panel"' (number of persons), r for the number of test group
members on the panel, n-r for the number of all other panel members,
p for the proportion of the test group in the eligible population, and
q for the proportion of all other groups in the population. Necessarily:
r + n-r N (3)
and
p+q= 1 (4)
The following example shows a concrete application of the com-
puting formula. Two Black persons have been selected for a jury panel
of five members; the proportion of Blacks in the eligible population is
.40. Is this selection outcome consistent with the assumption that there
has been an unbiased selection process? The question can be answered
yes if the probability of the outcome does not reach statistical signifi-
cance.
Pr--( 5) [ (.40)2 (.60)3 ]2
= [ (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) ] i(.16) (.216)]
[(2) (1)] [(3) (2) (1)]
= (10) (.03456)
= .346
The probability of .346 is larger than the chosen significance level
of .05, which means that the result is not significant, or, in other words,
that the selection outcome of two Blacks is compatible with the assump-
tion of an unbiased selection process.42  This conclusion, of course,
is not surprising: the proportion of Black persons in the population and
on the panel was exactly the same, namely 40%.
The formula just now used to compute Pr is a standard formula
41. The selection of grand juries proceeds in several stages. Panels or venires are
chosen from among the members of the eligible population. The grand jury is chosen
from among the members of the panel. In most cases the second step is truly random.
Discrimination, when it occurs, results from procedures used in the first step. The grand
jury panel, thus, is the proper body for tests of discrimination.
42. The tests for underrepresentation and overrepresentation are known as "one-
tailed" tests in the statistical literature. If the direction of the bias could not be pre-
dicted and a more general determination of fairness were to be made, a "two-tailed" test
would be employed. In practical terms, this would mean cumulating the specific prob-
abilities simultaneously, step-wise, from both ends of the distribution. Because under-
representation had been predicted in the example, a one-tailed test is employed here.
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and is mathematically correct. However, important limitations attach
to this formula when it is applied to jury selection cases. An unad-
justed use of the formula will produce erroneous results in many in-
stances. The formula works fairly well when the panel is small. As
the panel becomes larger, an adjusted approach is required.
The point that must be recognized is that for large panels there
are so many different possible selection outcomes that every one of
them, even the single most likely, has but a very small probability of
actually occurring. For large panels, every possible selection result can
be significant and, therefore, incompatible with the assumption of an
unbiased selection. Clearly, this makes no sense.
Two sets of computations will illuminate the problem. Table 1
presents the probabilities associated with each of all possible selection
outcomes for a panel of ten. The assumed proportion of the test group
Table 1. Probabilities for Compositions of Grand Jury
Panel of Ten Members, One Year
Probability of this Interpretat
r of Test Outcome; Test Group (One-tailed te:
MWembers is 40% of Eligible level; two ts
y Panel Population test=.10 le,
.00605 -
.04031
.12090
.21500
.25080
.20070
.11150
.04247
.01062
.00157
.00010
ion
st=.05
tiled
tel)
underrepresentation
nondiscriminatory
range
overrepresentation
in the eligible population of .40." Testing for underrepresentation
43. The test group is the group for which it has been alleged that the selection
procedures discriminated against its members.
Numbe
Group
on Jur
{3
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only with the standard formula, we find that the results of obtaining
zero members or one member are significant at the .05 level, which
means that these results are not compatible with the assumption of an
unbiased selection and must be rejected as discriminatory. Testing for
a fair outcome, rather than only underrepresentation, the outcomes of
zero, one, seven, eight, nine, and ten group members must be rejected,
that latter four identifying overrepresentation. Or, to state the matter
in positive terms, the outcomes of two, three, four, five, and six test
group members are compatible with random assumptions and can be
regarded as nondiscriminatory, given a significance level of .05 (.10).
Table 2 presents the probabilities for all selection outcomes from
zero to 150 test group members for a panel of 300 members.44 The
assumed proportion of the test group in the eligible population is
50%. 41 It can be seen immediately, that, using the significance level
of .05, all outcomes are significant, meaning, that none of them is com-
patible with the assumption of an unbiased selection. Not even the
outcome of 150 test group members in the panel can be regarded as
unbiased, although this outcome corresponds to exact proportionality:
50% in the population and 50% on the panel.4 6
The point of interest in the analysis of jury probabilities is not
really the specific likelihood of obtaining a certain panel, but rather it
is in the inference about the selection process which the computed
probability enables us to make, namely, whether or not the particular
selection result is compatible with the assumption of a fair selection
process, i.e., one in which every eligible person had the same chance
of being chosen. Bias in the selection process has been demonstrated
when the selection outcome is not compatible with the equal chance
assumption. Someone was favored and someone else disfavored in that
case.
44. The probabilities for the outcomes from 151 to 300 test group members are
not reported here in order to save space. These values would be required only for tests
of overrepresentation, or for the simultaneous testing of overrepresentation and under-
representation. Their absence does not affect the basic methodological point of this pa-
per.
45. The numbers in parentheses following the decimal point identify the number
of zeros to be inserted in the space. Thus, .(5)17 corresponds to .0000017. This nota-
tional system was adopted to avoid the inconvenience of having to write out numbers
which would fill a complete line on the pages, such as .(90)49. It also saves the reader
the task of having to count out a long string of zeros to identify the value of the figure.
46. If the more demanding .01 level of significance had been adopted, the results
of 135 to 150 would not have been significant. This may seem to be somewhat more
reasonable. However, the different significance level is not a solution to the general
problem. With a larger panel, even .01 would have produced only significant results,
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Table 2. Specific Probabilities for Composition of Grand Jury
Panel of 300 Members; One Year; Proportion of Test
Group in Population = .50
Number of
Test Group
Members on Specific
Jury Panel Probability
0 .(90)49
1 .(87)15
2 .(85)22
3 .(83)22
4 .(81)16
5 .(80)96
6 .(78)47
7 .(76)20
8 .(75)73
9 .(73)24
10 .(72)69
11 .(70)18
12 .(69)44
13 .(68)96
14 .(66)20
15 .(65)38
16 .(64)67
17 .(62)11
18 .(61)18
19 .(60)26
20 .(59)37
21 .(58)49
22 .(57)62
23 .(56)75
24 .(55)87
25 .(54)96
26 .(52)10
27 .(51)10
28 .(50)10
29 .(50)94
30 .(49)85
31 .(48)74
32 .(47)62
33 .(46)50
34 .(45)40
35 .(44)30
36 .(43)22
37 .(42)16
38 .(41)11
39 .(41)74
40 .(40)48
41 .(39)30
42 .(38)19
43 .(37)11
44 .(37)66
45 .(36)37
46 .(35)21
47 .(34)11
48 .(34)59
49 .(33)30
50 .(32)15
When the size of
Number of
Test Group
Members on
Jury Panel
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Number of
Test Group
Specific Members on
Probability Jury Panel
.(32)75
.(31)36
.(30)17
.(30)77
.(29)34
.(28)15
.(28)64
.(27)27
.(26)11
.(26)44
.(25)17
.(25)67
.(24)25
.(24)94
.(23)34
.(22)12
.(22)42
.(21)14
.(21)49
.(20)16
.(20)52
.(19)17
.(19)52
.(18)16
.(18)48
.(17) 14
.(17)41
.(16) 12
.(16)33
.(16)92
.(15)25
.(15)67
.(14)18
.(14)45
.(13)12
.(13)29
.(13)71
.(12)17
.(12)41
.(12)96
.(11)22
.(11)50
.(10)11
.(10)25
.(10)54
.(9)11
.(9)24
,(9)50
.(8)10
.(8)20
the jury panel is fairly large, a large number of
Specific
Probability
.(8)40
.(8)79
.(7)15
.(7)29
.(7)54
.(7)99
.(6)18
.(6)32
.(6)56
.(6)98
.(5)17
.(5)28
.(5)47
.(5)77
.(4)12
.(4)20
.(4)31
.(4)48
.(4)74
.(3)11
.(3)17
.(3)24
.(3)35
.(3)50
.(3)71
.(3)98
.0014
.0018
.0024
.0032
.0042
.0053
.0067
.0084
.0103
.0125
.0150
.0177
.0206
.0237
.0269
.0301
.0332
.0362
.0390
.0414
.0434
.0448
.0457
.0460
possible selection outcomes exists. For example, there are 301 possible
selection outcomes for a panel of 300 members, even when only two
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groups are taken into account. Necessarily, the probability of any one
of these 301 outcomes is quite low. Even the outcome of exact propor-
tionality, the relatively most likely result, has a likelihood of only 46
occurrences in 1000 selections.47 An unadjusted application of the
standard computing formula thus leads to the astonishing result that se-
lection bias must be inferred from every single outcome.
The solution to the problem is found in changing the focus of the
analysis from specific probabilities to cumulative probabilities, and from
single outcomes to ranges of outcomes.
The first step in the adjusted method is to discover the range of
discriminatory outcomes. 48  Assuming a test for underrepresentation,
the specific probabilities for all outcomes in the lower tail of the distri-
bution must be computed, beginning with the probability for the out-
come of "zero test group members on the panel" to the outcome where
the cumulative probability becomes larger than the pre-set significance
level.49 The outcome of "zero test group members" and the outcome
just prior to getting a cumulative probability larger than the significance
level identify the boundaries of the range of discriminatory outcomes.
The second step in the adjusted method is to determine whether
or not the actual outcome is within the range of discriminatory out-
comes. This is a matter of simple inspection.
The third step is the resulting inference about the selection proc-
ess. If the actual outcome is outside this range, bias has not been
demonstrated.
Table 3 presents the cumulative probabilities for all selection out-
comes from zero to 150 test group members for a panel of 300 mem-
bers, the test group constituting 50% of the eligible population. Table
3 is identical to Table 2, except for the shift from specific to cumulative
probabilities.
For the purpose of having some concrete examples by which to
illustrate the three steps discussed above, it will be assumed that two
selection outcomes are to be tested. In the first case 118 test group
members were selected for the panel, and in the second case 146. In
47. See Table 2, supra.
48. The present term "range of discriminatory outcomes" corresponds to the term
"critical region" in the statistical literature.
49. In a test for overrepresentation, the upper tail probabilities would be computed
and cumulated, beginning with the outcome of "300 test group members on the panel,"
if a panel of 300 persons is assumed.
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Table 3. Cumulative Probabilities for Composition of Grand Jury
Panel of 300 Members; One Year; Proportion of Test
Group in Population = .50
Number of
Test Group
Cumulative Members on
Probability Jury Panel
Number of
Test Group
Members on
Jury Panel
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Cumulative
Probability
.(90)49
.(87)15
.(85)22
.(83)22
.(81)16
.(80)98
.(78)48
.(76)20
.(75)75
.(73)24
.(72)71
.(70)19
.(69)45
.(67)10
.(66)21
.(65)40
.(64)71
.(62)12
.(61)19
.(60)28
.(59)40
.(58)53
.(57)68
.(56)82
.(55)95
.(53)11
.(52)11
.(51)11
.(50)11
.(49)11
.(49)96
.(48)84
.(47)71
.(46)50
.(45)45
.(44)35
.(43)26
.(42)18
.(41)13
.(41)86
.(40)57
.(39)36
.(38)22
.(37)14
.(37)79
.(36)45
.(35)25
.(34)14
.(34)73
.(33)38
.(32)19
Number of
Test Group
Members on
Jury Panel
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
.(32)94
.(31)45
.(30)21
.(30)98
.(29)44
.(28)19
.(28)84
.(27)35
.(26)15
.(26)59
.(25)23
.(25)91
.(24)35
.(23)13
.(23)47
.(22)17
.(22)59
.(21)21
.(21)70
.(20)23
.(20)75
.(19)24
.(19)76
.(18)24
.(18)72
.(17)21
.(17)63
.(16)18
.(16)51
.(15)14
.(15)39
.(14)11
.(14)28
.(14)73
.(13)19
.(13)48
.(12)12
.(12)29
.(12)70
.(11)17
.(11)39
.(11)89
.(10)20
.(10)45
.(10)98
.(9)21
.(9)45
.(9)95
.(8)20
.(8)40
Cumulative
Probability
.(8)80
.(7)16
.(7)31
.(7)60
.(6)11
.(6)21
.(6)39
.(6)71
.(5)13
.(5)23
.(5)40
.(5)68
.(4)11
.(4)19
.(4)31
.(4)51
.(4)82
.(3)13
.(3)20
.(3)31
.(3)48
.(3)72
.0011
.0016
.0023
.0033
.0047
.0065
.0089
.0121
.0163
.0216
.0283
.0367
.0470
.0595
.0745
.0922
.1128
.1365
.1634
.1935
.2267
.2629
.3019
.3433
.3867
.4315
.4772
.5232
both cases the panel size was 300 and the population proportion of the
test group .50.
Using the unadjusted method, the specific probability of .(4)48
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for the outcome of 118 test group members would result in the infer-
ence that bias in the selection process has been demonstrated. The
probability of .(4)48 is smaller than the significance level of .05, and
thus the outcome is significant. Using the adjusted method, the cumu-
lation of specific probabilities (Table 3) shows that the range of dis-
criminatory outcomes extends from zero to 135. The cumulative value
for this range equals .0470, which is smaller than the significance level
of .05. If the specific probability for 136 had been added, the cumula-
tive value of .0595 would have been larger than the significance level.
As the second step, the outcome of 118 is found to be inside the range
of discriminatory outcomes. Therefore, as the third step, it must be
concluded that the outcome of 118 test group members demonstrates
bias in the selection process. Here the two methods lead to the same
conclusions.
In the second case, the unadjusted method once more would lead
to the conclusion that bias has been demonstrated. The specific proba-
bility of .0414 for 146 test group members is smaller than the signifi-
cance level of .05. Using the adjusted method, as above, the outcome
of 146 test group members is found to be outside the range of discrim-
inatory outcomes. Bias in the selection process, therefore, has not
been demonstrated. Now the two methods lead to opposite conclu-
sions.
To state the matter more generally, under the conditions of a
panel of 300, 50%, and .05 significance, -the unadjusted method infers
bias from all outcomes. The adjusted method, in contrast, infers bias
only from the outcomes between zero and 135 test group members.
This of course, refers only to the test for underrepresentation. If all
biases were to be taken into account, the adjusted method would iden-
tify the outcomes from zero to 135 as belonging to the range of under-
representation, and the outcomes from 164 to 300 as belonging to the
range of over-representation. 5° The outcomes from 136 to 165'would
be identified as the range of nondiscriminatory outcomes. The unad-
justed method, of course, would still identify all outcomes as belonging
to the range of discriminatory outcomes.
The adjusted method is correct for all panel sizes including very
small ones, i.e., panels of ten members.51 The only difference is that
50. Table 6, infra.
51. The size of grand jury panels and venires varies considerably. None are as
small as ten. Most commonly they consist of more than 100 members, often including
as many as 300 or 400 persons.
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in the case of very small panels the unadjusted method can provide a
-fairly close approximation of the correct results. Table 1 showed that
the unadjusted method would infer underrepresentation bias in the se-
lection process from outcomes zero and one, and overrepresentation
bias from the outcomes seven, eight, nine, and ten. Table 4 shows
that the adjusted method comes to the same conclusion for the bias of
underrepresentation, and to nearly the same conclusion for the bias of
overrepresentation. The difference regards the outcome of seven test
group members. In spite of the occasional close approximation, how-
ever, there is no legitimate reason to use the unadjusted method.
Table 4. Cumulative Probabilities for Composit
Jury Panel of Ten Members, One Y4
Cumulative Probability
nber of Test of this Outcome; Test
up Members Group is 40% of Eligible
Jury Panel Population
0 I .00605
.04636
.16726
.05476
.01229
.00167
.00010
tions of Grand
'ar
Interpretation
(One-tailed test=.05
level; two-tailed
test=.10 level)
underrepresentation
nondiscriminatory
range
overrepresentation
The unadjusted method, of course, has the advantage of requiring
only a single computation to test for bias in the selection of a particular
panel. The adjusted method, however, does not always require as
large a set of computations as the foregoing paragraphs seem to indi-
cate. There are two important shortcuts that can be taken.
First, the specific probability of the actual selection outcome
should be computed before any of the others. If this specific probabil-
Nml
Gro
on
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ity by itself is larger than the selected significance level, it is evident
that it cannot be part of the range of discriminatory outcomes. The ad-
dition of this probability would necessarily raise the cumulative proba-
bility to a value above the significance level, if prior additions had not
already done that. Any outcome, then, with a specific probability
larger than the significance level cannot demonstrate bias in the selec-
tion process. Only a single computation is required for this determina-
tion, yet the logic of the adjusted method remains preserved.
Second, the specific tail probabilities need not be computed to the
point where the cumulative value exceeds the significance level; they
need to be computed only to the point of the actual outcome.52 If the
cumulative probability up to and including the specific probability of
the actual outcome is smaller than the significance level, it is evident
that the outcome is part of the range of discriminatory outcomes. Fre-
quently, the actual outcome will be much closer to the end of the tail
than to the point at which the cumulation crosses significance. Thus,
fairly few computations may be required. For example, if the actual
outcome is twenty test group members given a panel of 300 (with 50%
and .05), only twenty-one probability computations are needed to de-
termine the case, though 136 computations are required to find the
point of "crossing." (See Table 3.)
Table 5 shows the range of discriminatory outcomes for a series
of test group proportions in the population. The entries in the body
of the table are actual outcomes, that is, the number of test group mem-
bers on the panel. Table 5, as Table 6, includes only the figures for
the lower tail of the distribution. The upper tail tends to have only
theoretical interest. Actual jury selection litigation always involves the
underrepresentation of a particular group. 3 The table also delineates
the range of discriminatory outcomes for two different significance
levels. The purpose of this is to show what difference a change in sig-
nificance level would produce. As can be seen, the differences in-
crease from two outcomes for 5% to four outcomes for 15%. For a
population proportion of 50%, the difference is six outcomes. Given
the total number of outcomes, ithese differences are not very large.
52. This assumes, of course, that the interest is exclusively in what inference about
the selection process can be derived from the actual outcome, rather than in a determina-
tion of ranges of discrimination and nondiscrimination.
53. When one group is underrepresented, some other group or groups must be over-
represented, of couse. However, a test for the overrepresentation of one group is equiva-
lent to the test for the underrepresentation of another group only 'hen these two groups
together constitute all of the relevant population.
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Table 5. Selection Results Belonging to Range of Discriminatory
Outcomes (Underrepresentation) for Grand Jury
Panel of 300 Members
Proportion of Test Group in Population
.05 .08 .10 .12 .15
0 0 0 0 0_
Number of 1 1 1 1 1Test Group 2 2 2 2 2
Members on 3 3 3 3 3
Jury Panel 4 4 4 4 4
5 5 5 5 5
6 6 6 6 6
7 7 7 7 7
8 8 8 8 8
9 9 9 9 9
10 10 10 10 10
11 11 11 11 11
12 j 12 12 12 12
13 13 13 13 13
14 14 14 14 14
15 15 15 15 15
16 16 16 16 16
17 17 17 17 17
18 18 18 18 i
19 19 19 19 19
20 20 20 20 20
21 21 21 J21 21
22 22 22 22 22
23 23 23 23 23
24 24 24 24 1 24
25 25 25 25 25
26 26 26 26 j 26
27 27 27 27 27
28 28 28 28 28
29 29 29 29 29
30 30 30 30 30
31 31 31 31 31
32 32 32 32 32
33 33 33 33 33
34 34 34 34 34
35 35 35 35 35
- at .01 significance level
at .05 significance level
The significance level of .05, in any case, is most appropriate to the
particular problem area of jury selection litigation."4
Table 6 is included as an appendix to this article to allow the
54. See note 35 supra. This problem will be the subject of a separate paper.
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reader to inspect a fairly comprehensive set of data, and to obtain a
feeling for the behavior of specific and cumulative probabilities in var-
ious situations. Both types of probabilities are given, so that the reader
can see that the unadjusted and the adjusted method lead to different
conclusions even when the test group is only a very small part of the
population. The different methods lead to increasingly different con-
clusions as the test group proportions increase in size.
In sum, the specific probability of any actual jury selection out-
come (of any particular grand jury panel composition) is inadequate
for the determination of whether this outcome is compatible with the
assumption of a fair (equal chance) selection, or of whether it demon-
strates bias in the selection process. To determine the question of fair-
ness or bias in the selection process which gave rise to a particular jury
panel, a series of specific probabilities must be computed and cumu-
lated to identify the range of discriminatory outcomes. The inference
about bias, then, results from the location of the actual outcome. If
it is found inside the range of discriminatory outcomes, bias in the se-
lection process has been demonstrated. If it is found outside that
range, bias has not been demonstrated.
[Vol. 2
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